

DEFENDER

<u>Defending the European Energy Infrastructures</u> Critical Infrastructure Protection Topic 1

Prevention, detection, response and mitigation of the combination of physical and cyber threats to the critical infrastructure of Europe

ENTSO-E Meeting Prague, 22nd January 2020

Gabriele Giunta

DEFENDER Project Coordinator

Engineering Ingegneria Informatica Spa

Denis Čaleta

Security Advisory Board Member Institute for Corporative Security Studies





This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the grant agreement No 740898



DEFENDER identity card

Call Identifier: H2020 CIP-2016-2017-1

· Title: Defending the European Energy Infrastructures

• Starting Date: 1 May 2017

· Action Type: Innovation Action

• Duration: 36 months (Closing Date: 30/4/2020)

• EU Contribution: 6.790.837,50 €

• Partners: 18 (from 9 countries)

· Country coverage: Italy, Greece, France, Romania, Germany, Slovenia, Portugal, UK, Israel

Website: http://defender-project.eu/

ICT Service & Technology providers

SIEMENS (ICT)

• THALES (Security)

• P@WER! Lenate Media (SME - Solution Provider)

— lex (Data Privacy/Protection Enforcement))

R&D/Academy









Stakeholders

- ASM Electricity Network and Distribution Sys Operator
- Electricity Supplier, Bulk Generation
- **VBFP** Electricity Supplier, Wind Farm
- ELES Electricity Network and Transmission Sys Operator
- Law Enforcement Agency



What are the problems addressed by DEFENDER?



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the grant agreement No 740898



Examples of attacks on smart grid infrastructures



Access to the company system(s) via emails infected to stole credentials for controlling SCADAs. Destruction of files stored on servers and workstations causing 27 substations outage affecting about 225.000 customers

European blackout (2006)

More than 15 million clients of the Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) did not have access to electricity for about two hours due to an accidental insufficient inter-TSO coordination



Dragonfly attacks on US Power Grid (2018)



Scattered attacks on several facilities in in the US, Switzerland, and Turkey using several means of attack (malicious emails and trojanized software) targeting key systems for leaking network security credentials and stealing information

Human and drone attacks (2013; 2019)

Gunmen fired on 17 Metcalf electrical transformers, causing more than \$15 million of equipment damages.






While recognising the threat from terrorism as a priority, the protection of critical infrastructure will be based on an all-hazards all-sectors approach.

Critical Infrastructures depend on each other, but...

... all the other critical infrastructures have a strong dependency from **Critical Energy Infrastructures**




Source: European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection - Council Directive 2008/114/EC Source: A new approach to the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection Making European Critical Infrastructures more secure EPCIP [SWD (2013) 318]

5



Security is fundamental for smart critical energy infrastructures (CEIs)

ICT provides new opportunities to gather and analyze performance data, making it possible to preemptively notice and remedy technical vulnerabilities in the system ...



... but the increased interconnectivity associated with ICT exposes CEIs to increased cyber-risks and vulnerabilities, and global **security** issues that arise in the interaction between the cyber and the physical, institutional and human layers of the system

Cyber attacks on the power grid are constantly increasing in sophistication



Fragmented landscape of innovative solutions for CEIs


- Limits in the **threat scope** (e.g. either cyber or physical threats)
- Limits in the coverage of the energy value chain (from generation to consumer, from operation to market)



- Limits within the **organisation**, **silos** (e.g. technical, operations, business)
- Rarely involving human dimension (citizens or workers)
- Little systematic relationship between Power Network Operators and Security Operators/Service Providers and/or Law Enforcement Agencies
- Interaction and underlying procedures for linking Power Network Operators
 with Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and Information
 Sharing & Analysis Centres (EE-ISAC) still challenging at both governance
 and technological levels

© Defender 2018 All rights reserved

Slide No. 7





Achieved results



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the grant agreement No 740898



q

DEFENDER (up to date) achieved results #1 The content of this slide has been omitted



From CEI State of the Environment to Comprehension

The content of this slide has been omitted

© Defender 2018 All rights reserved

Slide No. 11

11





CEI vulnerability analysis

The content of this slide has been omitted

© Defender 2018 All rights reserve

......

13

DEFENDER (up to date) achieved results #2





The content of this slide has been omitted



© Defender 2018 All rights reserved

....



Cyber Detectors

The content of this slide has been omitted

□ Defender 2018 All rights reserved

15

Physical Detectors

DEFENDER

The content of this slide has been omitted

© Defender 2018 All rights reserved

....

IFIP 10.4 WG – 29 Gennaio 202



Perception of the current state of the environment

The content of this slide has been omitted



© Defender 2018 All rights reserved.

17


People acting as cyber security sensors




The content of this slide has been omitted


© Defender 2018 All rights reserved

Slide No. 18











Decentralized RES* Generation pilot

The content of this slide has been omitted

Upfender 2018 All rights reserve

23

TSO* Network pilot



The content of this slide has been omitted

© Defender 2018 All rights reserved

....




DSO* Network & Prosumer pilot

The content of this slide has been omitted

© Defender 2018 All rights reserved

Slide No. 2





27



DEFENDER contribution to EU policy goals

- Analysis of new and future complex threats to CEI
- Analysis of selected scenarios of threats to CEI (attack tree method evaluation)



- Analyses of processes and procedures that address certain security gaps in the field of physical and cyber security including human in the loop approach)
- Analysis of interdependency between CEI and other CI sectors





 Establishment of DEFENDER Critical Energy Infrastructure Security Stakeholders Group (CEIS-SG) (exchanging best practices, new knowledge and developments)

© Defender 2018 All rights reserved.

Slide No. 2



Defending the European
Critical Energy Infrastructure

Thank you for your attention

For further information do not hesitate to contact us at the following email:

gabriele.giunta@eng.it denis.caleta@ics-institut.si

https://defender-project.eu/



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the grant agreement No 740898